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I. INTRODUCTION
A. In General
President Obama's May 2009 international tax proposals' have
sparked a heated debate.2 Comments have ranged from the pessimis-
tic (Obama's proposals "would . . . reduc[e] U.S. exports as well as
business investment and jobs in the United States");' to the optimistic
(Obama's proposals would close the loopholes that multinational cor-
porations have been exploiting for years);' and to the skeptical
(Obama's proposals do not go far enough in fighting the unfairness of
the deferral system).5 Prior to the announcement of these proposals,
opposing policy commentators argued vigorously for scrapping the
current deferral system all together and adopting either a territorial
(i.e., exemption) system 6 or an imputation taxation system.7
1. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Leveling the Playing
Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas (May 4,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press-office/LEVELING-THE-PLAYING-
FIELD-CURBING-TAX-HAVENS-AND-REMOVING-TAX-INCENTIVES-FOR-SHIFT
ING-JOBS-OVERSEAS [hereinafter white House Outline].
2. See generally William H. Byrnes, President Obama's International Tax Proposals in a
Policy Context, 2009 EMERGING ISSUEs 3843 (2009); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: A Look at
Obama's International Proposals, 123 TAX NOTES 651 (2009); James Reardon et al., The Practi-
cal Effects of the Obama International Tax Proposals, 124 TAX NOTEs 999 (2009) [hereinafter
Reardon, Practical Effects of the Obama International Tax Proposals].
3. KEVIN BRADY, JoINT ECON. Comm. REPORT ON OBAMA'S TAX POLICY To OUTSOURCE
INVESTMENT AND JOBS 1 (2009).
4. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Obama International Tax Plan: A Major Step Forward,
U. MICH. LAw & ECON., Olin Working Paper No. 09-007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1400624; see also Rosanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, 2000 WTD
64-15 (2000) (discussing the benefits of the deferral system).
5. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Obama's International Tax Proposal Is Too Timid, 54 TAX
NOTES INT'L 579 (2009); Clifton J. Fleming et al., Perspectives on the Worldwide vs. Territorial
Taxation Debate, 125 TAX NOTES 1079 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Perspectives].
6. See Peter Mullins, Moving to Territoriality? Implications for the U.S. and the Rest of the
World, 43 TAX NOTES INT'L 839 (2006).
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There are three basic approaches a country can take in structur-
ing the taxation of active (as distinguished from passive) foreign in-
come earned by companies owned by residents of such country: (1) a
deferral system, which is employed by the U.S.; (2) an exemption sys-
tem, which is employed by several European countries, Canada, and
Australia; and (3) an imputation system, which was employed by New
Zealand, until it moved to an exemption system in 2009.8
B. Deferral System
In the U.S. deferral system, the active earnings of U.S.-owned
foreign corporations (i.e., controlled foreign corporations such as a
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation) gener-
ally are not subject to U.S. taxation until the income is repatriated to
the U.S., for example, in the form of dividends.' Also, at the time of
repatriation, the U.S. parent corporation may receive a foreign tax
credit (i.e., a reduction in its U.S. tax liability) for the foreign taxes
paid by the foreign subsidiary on the distributed earnings.10 This type
of system is referred to as a deferral system, because the general prin-
ciple of worldwide U.S. taxation is deferred (i.e., does not apply) until
the income of a controlled foreign corporation is repatriated. The
benefit of deferral is generally not available for passive income (e.g.,
interest and dividends) earned by a controlled foreign corporation.
Since its inception, opponents of the U.S. deferral system have
attempted to bring about its demise." In the 1960s, Congress suc-
ceeded in repealing deferral on passive investment income and, to a
limited extent, on certain active income.12 Opponents of the deferral
system argue that it allows multinational corporations to "hide" other-
wise taxable income in foreign jurisdictions. By using creative ac-
7. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Throw Territorial Taxation from the Train, 46 TAX
NOTES INT'L 63 (2007); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., How Should Congress React To Bush's Tax
Proposals?, 114 TAX NOTES 1233 (2007) (see Part VIII, proposing that Congress "tax on a cur-
rent basis all of the income of foreign corporations controlled by U.S. taxpayers").
8. New Zealand Revamps Tax Regime for Controlled Foreign Companies, 198 Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) 1-1 (Oct. 16, 2009).
9. See I.R.C. § 951 et seq.; SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX PLAN-
NING AND POLICY: INCLUDING CROss-BORDER MERGERS AND AcQuISrrIONS 393-454 (2007)
[hereinafter THOMPSON, INTERNATIONAL TAx PLANNING] (discussing CFC rules).
10. See I.R.C. § 902 (2006). See generally THOMPSON, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING,
supra note 9, at 227-304.
11. Reardon, Practical Effects of the Obama International Tax Proposals, supra note 2.
12. Id.
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counting methods and transfer pricing, U.S. corporations are able to
use their foreign subsidiaries to lessen their tax burden in the U.S.13
C. Exemption System
In an exemption system, the active income of a controlled foreign
corporation is not subject to taxation in the home country of the par-
ent corporation at the time the income is earned or at the time the
income is repatriated. Thus, foreign active income is exempt from
home-country taxation. Exemption systems are sometimes referred to
as territorial systems, meaning that foreign active income is only sub-
ject to taxation in the country where it is earned. As with the U.S.
deferral system, most exemption systems do not grant the benefit of
the exemption to passive income.
An exemption system is consistent with what economists call the
Capital Import Neutrality principle:
Capital import neutrality refers to a system of international taxation
where income from investment located in each country is taxed at
the same rate regardless of the residence of the investor. Some com-
mentators refer to the principle of capital import neutrality as pro-
moting "competitiveness." Under capital import neutrality, capital
income from all businesses operating in any one locality is subject to
uniform taxation. The nationality of investors in a particular locality
will not affect the rate of tax.14
D. Imputation System
In an imputation system, all earnings of a foreign subsidiary,
whether active or passive, are imputed to the parent corporation at
the time the earnings are realized, and the parent is given a foreign tax
credit for any foreign taxes paid with respect to such income. Thus,
the income of the foreign subsidiary passes through to the parent cor-
poration much like the income of a partnership passes through to the
partners. In a pure imputation system, both the foreign jurisdiction
13. Gov'T ACCOUNrABILITY OFFICE, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITI'EE ON FINANCE,
U.S. SENATE, TAX COMPLIANCE, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL AcrivrrY CREATES ENFORCEMENT IS-
SUES FOR IRS, GAO-09-478T, 4 (Mar. 17, 2009) (finding that "creation of offshore entities and
structures can be relatively easy and inexpensive .... [E]stablishing a Cayman Islands exempted
company can be accomplished for less than $600. . . and the company is not required to maintain
its register of shareholders in the Cayman Islands or hold an annual shareholders meeting.").
14. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF PRESENT-LAW
RULES AND REGULATIONS AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, 4 (Comm.
Print 1999) [hereinafter JCT, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION].
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and the home country tax the income of the foreign corporation as
such income is earned.
An imputation system is consistent with what economists refer to
as the Capital Export Neutrality principle:
Capital export neutrality refers to a system where an investor resid-
ing in a particular locality can locate investment anywhere in the
world and pay the same tax. Under capital export neutrality, deci-
sions on the location of investment are not distorted by taxes. Capi-
tal export neutrality is a principle describing how investors pay tax,
not to whom they pay. Capital export neutrality primarily is a
framework for discussing the efficiency and incentives faced by pri-
vate investors, and not the distribution of the revenues and benefits
of international investment.15
E. Focus Here Is on Active Income of Controlled Foreign
Corporations
In both the U.S. deferral system and generally in exemption sys-
tems, foreign passive income is taxed on a current or imputation basis.
This means that passive income is imputed to the parent corporation
at the time the income is earned, thereby imposing an immediate
home country tax on the passive income. However, the home country
tax may be reduced by a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid on
the passive income. This is an accepted norm and no policy commen-
tator that I am aware of has argued for deferral or exemption of for-
eign passive income.
The general distinction between active and passive income is that
active income is income earned by a company's primary business ac-
tivities while passive income is income earned by a company through
means other than its primary business activities. 16 A Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) report on exemption systems identifies
some of the many challenges presented when attempting to tax active
foreign-source income, including "ensuring tax law compliance, mini-
mizing tax induced distortions of [business] decisions about where to
locate investment, avoiding the double taxation of income earned in
15. Id.
16. See Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMM. ON FINANCE, U.S. SEN-
ATE, INT'L TAXATION, STUDY COUNTRIES THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN-SOURCE INCOME FACE COM-
PLIANCE RISKS AND BURDENS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES GAO-09-934, at 6
(Sept. 2009) [hereinafter GAO, REPORT ON EXEMPTION SYSTEMS]. For a good illustration of
different types of foreign-source income, see Table 1. Id.
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one country by companies located in another country, and minimizing
unnecessary taxpayer compliance burden, such as recordkeeping.""7
Notwithstanding the challenges that can be presented in distin-
guishing active from passive income, the discussion here focuses only
on the treatment of active trade or business income of foreign subsidi-
aries, and to simplify matters further, the discussion assumes that the
foreign subsidiary is wholly-owned by a U.S. (or home country) par-
ent corporation. In the U.S., such corporations are referred to as
"controlled foreign corporations," or CFCs."s
F. The Debate
The crux of an ongoing debate in international tax focuses on
whether to tax active foreign-source income earned by foreign-subsid-
iaries of multinational corporations, and, if so, the most effective and
efficient way to tax such income. The outcome of this debate has a
wide ranging effect on (1) the U.S., (2) multinational corporations,
and (3) other countries around the world as a result of the global in-
fluence of multinational corporations based in the U.S. No country
has a pure exemption or pure imputation system, and most countries
have adopted a hybrid of the two systems.19
G. Guide to the Balance of the Article
This article first gives a perspective on the dimensions of the is-
sues surrounding the taxation of foreign source income (Part II) and
then discusses transfer pricing and related issues (Part III). The arti-
cle then discusses the pros and cons of (1) the current deferral system
(Part IV), (2) an exemption system (Part V), and (3) an imputation
system (Part VI). As discussed in Part VI.B.6, significant revenues
would be realized by moving from the current deferral system to an
imputation system, and Part VI.B.7 proposes that at least a part of the
enhanced revenues be used to reduce the corporate tax rate for all
17. Id. at 1.
18. The anti-deferral rules in the U.S. currently apply to a "controlled foreign corporation"
(CFC), which is a foreign corporation where U.S. persons holding at least 10 percent of the stock
of such corporation own in the aggregate more than 50% of the stock of the corporation.
THOMPSON, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING, supra note 9, at 393, 399.
19. GAO, REPORT ON EXEMPTION SYSTEMs, supra note 16, at 2. (The GAO report finds
that "large developed countries do not use a pure worldwide [imputation] or pure territorial
[exemption] approach when taxing foreign-source corporate income." The report does not dis-
cuss tax systems used by medium-sized developed or under developed countries).
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corporations. Part VII concludes that the U.S. should adopt an impu-
tation system.
II. A PERSPECTIVE ON THE DIMENSIONS OF THE
ISSUES SURROUNDING THE TAXATION OF
FOREIGN-SOURCE INCOME
A December 2008 report by the GAO20 presents a good picture
of the challenges facing the U.S. in addressing the issues involving the
taxation of foreign income. The GAO report detailed the 100 largest
U.S. companies and federal contractors, as well as the number of sub-
sidiaries each company has located in a tax haven 2 1 or financial pri-
vacy jurisdiction.2 2 The report found that "[83] of the 100 largest
publicly traded U.S. corporations in terms of 2007 revenue reported
having subsidiaries in jurisdictions listed as tax havens or financial pri-
vacy jurisdictions and 74 of the 83 had federal contracts in the fiscal
year 2007."23
The GAO report also noted that of the 83 companies with foreign
subsidiaries, "[12] corporations had more than 50 percent of their for-
eign subsidiaries in jurisdictions listed as tax havens or financial pri-
vacy jurisdictions." 2 4  Appendix II of the GAO's report includes
figures showing the number of foreign subsidiaries and the number of
those subsidiaries in tax havens or financial privacy jurisdictions. For
example, as of December 2008, Citigroup had 1,240 foreign subsidiar-
ies; 427 of those foreign subsidiaries were located in tax havens or
20. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONG. REQUESTERS, INT'L TAXATION,
LARGE U.S. CORP. & FED. CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN JURISDICTIONs LISTED AS TAX
HAVENS OR FIN. PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS, GAO-09-157 (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter GAO, TAX
HAVEN REPORT]. While the report focuses on the location of foreign subsidiaries, it did not seek
to determine whether foreign subsidiaries in tax havens or offshore financial centers were used
for the purpose of reducing a company's tax burden.
21. The report did not seek to define the term "tax haven" or compile a list of countries
considered to be tax havens. The report simply noted characteristics that define and identify tax
havens to be "no taxes or nominal taxes; lack of effective exchange of tax information with
foreign tax authorities; lack of transparency in the operation of legislative, legal, or administra-
tive provisions; no requirement for a substantive local presence; or self-promotion as an offshore
financial center." Id. at 2 n.6.
22. The report also did not seek to define the term "offshore financial center" or "financial
privacy jurisdiction." The report simply noted again the characteristics that a few sources have
used to describe offshore financial centers as jurisdictions that have a high level of nonresident
financial activity and that may have low or no taxes, light and flexible regulation, and a high level
of client confidentiality. The report noted also that a characteristic that has been used to de-
scribe financial privacy centers is a jurisdiction that has strict bank secrecy laws that persons can
use to shield their wealth from taxation in their home countries. Id. at 2 n.7.
23. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
24. Id.
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financial privacy jurisdictions.2 5 Specifically, 90 foreign subsidiaries
were located in the Cayman Islands (a known tax haven) and 40 for-
eign subsidiaries were located in Hong Kong (also a tax haven).2 6
Marathon Oil had 115 foreign subsidiaries; 76 of those foreign subsidi-
aries were located in tax havens or financial privacy jurisdictions, with
65 of these foreign subsidiaries located in the Cayman Islands.27 Mor-
gan Stanley had 568 foreign subsidiaries; 273 of those foreign subsidi-
aries were located in tax havens or financial privacy jurisdictions, with
158 located in the Cayman Islands and 29 located in Luxembourg
(also a tax haven).2 8
These data show that the IRS has its hands quite full in determin-
ing whether the income earned by these foreign subsidiaries is prop-
erly reported. If the U.S. were to adopt a pure imputation system as
proposed below, much of the incentive for companies to establish
multiple foreign subsidiaries in tax havens would be eliminated be-
cause the U.S. parent would be required to report all of the income
earned by each of the subsidiaries.
III. TRANSFER PRICING AND DEFLECTION OF
EXPENSE ABUSE IN THE CONTEXT OF
FOREIGN-SOURCE INCOME
A. Transfer Pricing Abuse
Transfer pricing is "the allocation of profits for tax and other pur-
poses between parts of a multinational corporate group. "29 John
Neighbour gives the following example:
Consider a profitable UK computer group that buys micro-chips
from its own subsidiary in Korea: how much the UK parent pays
it-the transfer price-will determine how much profit the Korean
unit reports and how much local tax it pays. If the parent pays be-
low normal local market prices, the Korean unit may appear to be in
financial difficulty, even if the group as a whole shows a decent
profit margin when the completed computer is sold. UK tax admin-
istrators might not grumble as the profit will be reported at their
25. Id.
26. GAO, TAX HAVEN REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
27. Id. at 32.
28. Id. at 34.
29. John Neighbour, Transfer pricing: Keeping It at Arm's Length, OECD OBSERVER, July
3, 2008, http://oecdobserver.org/news/fulstory.php/aid/670/Transfer-pricing:-Keeping-it-at
arms_1ength.html. See also THOMPSON, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING, supra note 9, at 349.
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end, but their Korean counterparts will be disappointed not to have
much profit to tax on their side of the operation. 30
Although Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code requires that
sales and other transfers between related parties be at an "arm's
length" price, a 2007 report by the Department of the Treasury found
that some U.S. corporations use transfer pricing as a way to avoid
paying U.S. taxes by transferring income from the U.S. to a subsidiary
located in a foreign jurisdiction.
According to the GAO's September 2009 report to the U.S. Sen-
ate's Committee on Finance, many tax agency officials in countries
with exemption systems, whom the drafters of the report consulted,
consider transfer pricing to be the single greatest compliance risk re-
lated to the taxation of foreign-source income. 3 2 The possible magni-
tude of the compliance risk related to transfer pricing is shown in the
GAO's report, which states:
Trade in services in the United States, while not a measure of over-
all U.S. trade provides an example. According to the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, trade in services between CFCs [i.e., foreign
subsidiaries] and related parties increased (in nominal dollars) from
approximately $38.4 billion in 1999 to approximately $178.7 billion
in 2006.33
Along the same lines, a 1999 report by the Staff of the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation provided the following analysis of the magnitude
of intra-firm sales between U.S. parents and their controlled foreign
subsidiaries: "[I]n 1994[,] intra-firm trade accounted for at least 40
percent of U.S. merchandise exports [i.e., sales by U.S. persons to for-
eign persons] and 44 percent of U.S. merchandise imports [i.e., sales
by foreign persons to U.S. persons]."3 4 It would appear that the level
of intra-firm sales has increased from the 1994 levels. In any event,
this high level of intra-firm transfers puts a significant amount of pres-
sure on Section 482 and the ability of the IRS to properly administer
it. Furthermore, the importance of transfer pricing is illustrated by
the 2006 settlement between the IRS and Glaxo-SmithKline, where
30. Id.
31. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONG. ON EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER
PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TREATIES (Nov. 2007) [hereinafter TREASURY, TRANSFER PRICING
REPORT].
32. GAO, REPORT ON EXEMPTION SYSTEMS, supra note 16, at 19.
33. Id. (citing U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Int'l Serv. Cross-Border Trade 1986-2007
and Serv. Supplied Through Affiliates, 1986-2006).
34. JCT, EcoNoMIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 14, at 14.
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the pharmaceutical company agreed to pay $3.4 billion for tax defi-
ciencies in transfer pricing over a 12 year period." Glaxo-SmithKline
is not alone when it comes to recent transfer pricing disputes: Merck
& Co. also had tax claims of approximately $5.6 billion asserted
against it regarding its transfer pricing practices.3 6 The IRS also has
several other cases regarding transfer pricing issues either pending
before the U.S. Tax Court or recently settled.
One of the ways that countries currently attempt to address issues
with transfer pricing is by developing advanced pricing agreement
(APA) programs, which bring the taxpayer and the taxing authority
together to agree on transfer pricing issues before the actual tax re-
turn is filed." Arguably, the use of APA programs is a more efficient
way to eliminate or alleviate the issues associated with transfer pric-
ing, but the GAO reports that many tax experts cast doubt on the
effectiveness of such programs. 3 9 These programs can be time con-
suming and require an abundance of documentation and correspon-
dence that, as a result, has caused some taxpayers to seek such
agreements for only large value transactions. On small value transac-
tions, taxpayers will generally avoid entering into such APA programs
and will only address such pricing issues if questioned by the respec-
tive taxing authority.4 0 in any event, APAs can only address a small
fraction of the transactions raising significant transfer pricing issues.
B. Deflection of Expense Abuse
In addition to transfer pricing issues arising in the sale of goods
and the provision of services, similar issues can arise with the alloca-
tion of expenses and interest. For example, it may be beneficial for a
35. Kleinbard, supra note 7, at 552 (citing I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-142 (Sept. 11,
2006)).
36. Id.
37. TREASURY, TRANSFER PRICING REPORT, supra note 31, at 46. In this report, the Trea-
sury notes the following transfer pricing cases: H Group Holding, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1999-334; Adaptec, Inc. v. Commissioner, Docket Nos. 10077-00, 3480-01; BIB USA, Inc.
v. Commissioner, Docket No. 4434-03; BMC Software v. Commissioner, Docket No. 2671-00;
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-220; Dart Container Corp. v. Com-
missioner, Docket No. 10526-01; ... Mark Kay Corp. v. Commissioner, Docket No. 18150-02;
Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, Docket No. 12225-02; United Parcel Service of
America, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-268, rev'd and remanded, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th
Cir. 2001), dismissed per stipulation, order entered Jan. 22, 2003; Veritas Software Corp. v. Com-
missioner, Docket No. 12075-06; Xilinx, Inc. v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 37 (2005), appeals dock-
eted, Nos. 06-74246 and 06-74269 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2006).





company to treat interest and other expenses that are properly alloca-
ble to foreign income as allocated to domestic income. This could re-
sult in the deduction of such interest or other expense in the
computation of high-taxed U.S. income rather than in the computa-
tion of low-taxed foreign income. The Obama Administration's May
2009 International Tax Proposals address the deflection of expense is-
sue: "[C]ompanies [will not] receive deductions on their U.S. tax re-
turns supporting their offshore investments until they pay taxes on
their offshore profits."41
C. Impact of Imputation System on Transfer Pricing and
Deflection of Expense Abuse
As will be seen below, both deferral and exemption systems are
vulnerable to transfer pricing and deflection of expense abuse as tax-
payers attempt to divert as much active income (and as little expense)
as possible to low tax jurisdictions. On the other hand, a pure imputa-
tion system takes away most, if not all, of the incentive to engage in
transfer price and expense manipulation in transactions between a
U.S. parent corporation and its foreign subsidiary. Thus, adoption of
the exemption system, as discussed below, would have the secondary
benefit of significantly reducing transfer pricing and deflection of ex-
pense abuse.
IV. THE DEFERRAL SYSTEM
A. Description of the Deferral System
The deferral system is a hybrid system. For active foreign source
income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent, the deferral
system turns off (i.e., defers) (1) the U.S. principle requiring that the
worldwide income of the U.S. parent be subject to U.S. taxation, with
an appropriate foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid, until (2) such
active income is repatriated to the U.S. The repatriation can be share-
holder income in the form of dividends or liquidating distributions
from the foreign subsidiary42 or from the sale by the U.S. parent cor-
poration of the stock of the foreign subsidiary.43
Under the controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules of Sections
951 through 964, passive income and certain other types of "subpart
41. See White House Outline, supra note 1.
42. I.R.C. § 951(a) (2006).
43. I.R.C. § 1248 (2006).
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F" income (i.e., tax haven type income) of a CFC is subject to taxation
under an imputation system, meaning that the subpart F income is
imputed to the controlling U.S. parent at the time the income is
earned with a foreign tax credit, subject to limitation, for any foreign
taxes paid on the tax haven type income."
The deferral system is not available for foreign income earned by
a foreign branch or division of a U.S. corporation; under the U.S.'s
worldwide approach, such branch or division income is subject to U.S.
taxation at the time it is earned, with an appropriate foreign tax credit
for foreign taxes paid on such income.4 5 Because branch income does
not get the benefit of deferral, most foreign business activity of U.S.
corporations is conducted through foreign subsidiaries.
The following example illustrates the effect the deferral system
can have on the investment decisions of U.S. corporations.4 6 Assume
that State Oil Corp. is engaged in the oil exploration business and is
headquartered in State College, PA. It is faced with the following in-
vestment decision:
(1) invest $50 million in oil exploration and refining in State Col-
lege, which is expected to produce $10 million in annual taxa-
ble income; or
(2) set up a subsidiary in China, China Oil Sub., and have it invest
$50 million in oil exploration and refining in China, which is
also expected to produce $10 million in annual taxable income.
Thus, the pretax return of both investments is $10 million. How-
ever, State Oil Corp. is faced with a 35% effective corporate tax rate
in the U.S., and China Oil Sub. would be faced with a 15% effective
corporate tax rate in China.47 Other things being equal, under our
deferral system which investment decision would State Oil Corp.
make?
The answer is clear: State Oil Corp. would invest in China be-
cause the after-tax return on the China investment is $8.5 million ($10
million minus the $1.5 million China tax), while the after-tax return
for the State College investment is only $6.5 million ($10 million mi-
nus the $3.5 million U.S. tax).
44. For a discussion of the CFC rules, see THOMPSON, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING,
supra note 9, at 393-454.
45. Id. at 227-304.
46. This example is based on an example in Obama's International Tax Proposal Is Too
Timid, supra note 5.
47. Assume for the purpose of this discussion that the effective corporate tax rates are the
same as the maximum statutory rates.
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This is the case even though under the U.S. deferral system, State
Oil Corp. would be subject to U.S. tax when China Oil Sub. repatri-
ates its after-tax income to State Oil Corp. in the form of dividends.
As a result of the foreign tax credit provisions, at that time of repatria-
tion, State Oil Corp. would have to pay an additional $2 million in tax,
so that the combined China tax ($1.5 million) and U.S. tax ($2 million)
on the repatriated income would be 35%. Thus, the U.S. tax on the
income of China Oil Sub. is "deferred" until the income is repatriated.
Through the use of creative schemes pursuant to which the de-
ferred foreign income is reinvested in foreign businesses, the deferral
can be indefinite or even permanent. In other words, if all of the for-
eign business earnings are reinvested in foreign businesses, the U.S.
tax is never imposed on any of such earnings. This is referred to as the
"lockout effect;" that is, the deferral system has the effect of locking
foreign earnings out of the U.S., thereby distorting the investment de-
cisions of U.S. firms by making foreign investment more beneficial
than domestic investment.
The example of State Oil understates the effect of the deferral
system on investment decisions of U.S. firms. In the above example,
the pre-tax returns of the investments in the U.S. and China are the
same, that is, $10 million. However, even if the pre-tax return of the
investment in China is lower than the pre-tax return in the U.S., it
may still be beneficial for State Oil to make the investment in China.
For example, if the pre-tax return on an investment in China were $8
million instead of $10 million, it still would be more beneficial for
State Oil to invest in China rather than in the U.S. as long as the
China earnings could be deferred for a significant period. This princi-
ple can be illustrated as follows. Assume that State Oil has an $8 mil-
lion pre-tax return in China. In such case, the China tax is $1.2 million
(15% of $8 million), and the after-tax earnings are $6.8 million ($8
million-$1.2 million), which is more than the $6.5 million after tax re-
turn with an investment in the U.S. at the higher $10 million pre-tax
return.
Also, because the foreign tax credit is not computed on a business
by business or a country by country basis, through proper repatriation
planning, the repatriation of low-taxed foreign business income (i.e.,
foreign income taxed at a rate lower than the U.S. rate) can be imple-
mented at the same time as the repatriation of high-taxed foreign bus-
iness income (i.e., foreign income taxed at a rate higher than the U.S.
rate). By using this device, the excess foreign tax credits on the high-
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taxed foreign business income (foreign taxes in excess of the 35% U.S.
rate) can be used to shelter from U.S. tax, low-taxed foreign income.
This is referred to as cross crediting; that is, using excess foreign tax
credits imposed on high-taxed income to prevent U.S. tax on low-
taxed foreign income.
B. The Benefits of the Deferral System
1. Capital Export Neutrality
The deferral system is a balance between capital export neutrality
and capital import neutrality. The deferral system attains the goal of
capital export neutrality by deferring the U.S. tax on active foreign
income of foreign subsidiaries, thereby initially subjecting those sub-
sidiaries to the same tax rate that applies to other businesses compet-
ing against the foreign subsidiary in the particular country. This gives
foreign subsidiaries the ability to compete in the countries they are
located in by allowing them to retain more working capital. This is
referred to as the competitiveness principle; that is, the deferral prin-
ciple arguably enhances the competitiveness of U.S. companies that
invest abroad. As will be seen below, an exemption system adheres
completely to the competitiveness principle, and an imputation system
is inconsistent with the principle.
2. Capital Import Neutrality
The deferral system is also consistent with the capital import neu-
trality principle because it imposes a U.S. tax at the time the deferred
income is repatriated to the U.S., thereby recapturing the lost U.S. tax
revenue upon repatriation. However, because of the potential for in-
finite or permanent deferral and cross crediting at the time of repatri-
ation, the deferral system is more consistent with the capital export
neutrality principle than the capital import neutrality principle.
C. The Problems with the Deferral System
1. Time Value of Money
The deferral system gives a "time value of money" advantage to
foreign investment over domestic investment.48 The time value of
money concept holds that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar
48. THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND




tomorrow. Therefore, a corporation would prefer to pay tax at a later
time rather than when the income is earned. Due to the postpone-
ment of paying of tax, the deferral system allows foreign-source in-
come to be taxed at a lower effective rate than if it were earned
domestically.4 9 According to the U.S. President's Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform the deferral system "creates an incentive for the
foreign subsidiary to retain the earnings as long as possible and dis-
torts other business and investment decisions."50
2. Incentive for Foreign over U.S. Investment
The deferral system addresses, at least in part, the foreign com-
petitiveness principle by not subjecting the active earnings of foreign
subsidiaries to immediate U.S. taxation. However, deferral produces
another competitiveness issue: the creation of an unlevel playing field
between business conducted in the U.S.-in State College, for exam-
ple-and business conducted in China. Thus, in purportedly address-
ing the foreign competitiveness issue, the deferral system creates a
U.S. competitiveness issue.
3. Illustration of the "Lockout Effect"
One of the strongest pieces of evidence for the argument that the
current deferral system is inadequate was the repatriation of foreign-
source income after the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004.1' As a result of the passage of this Act, there was a one-year
reduction in the tax rate on repatriated dividends and the amount of
dividends from foreign companies that occurred during this time was
staggering. Mullins reports that data show "an almost fivefold in-
crease in dividends from foreign companies since the measure was in-
troduced (US $244 billion in 2005 compared with US $50 billion in
2004). That outcome is consistent with research that has found there
is a negative relationship between dividend repatriation taxes and div-
idend payout rates."52
4. Complexity
Another problem with the current U.S. deferral system is the
complex nature of the rules and regulations governing foreign-source
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Mullins, supra note 6, at 839 n.18.
52. Id. at 839, nn.19-20.
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income. As one editorial in the Wall Street Journal said, the deferral
system is "a tax code so riddled with complexity that it is both expen-
sive to administer and inefficient at collecting revenue."" This idea of
complexity is also addressed by Professor Peroni in his article, Defer-
ral of U.S. Tax on International Income: End It, Don't Mend It-Why
Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?,54 where he claims
that Subpart F, the part of the Internal Revenue Code addressing for-
eign-source income, is already too complex.
5. Transfer Pricing and Deflection of Expense Abuse
The deferral system also presents opportunities for abuses with
transfer pricing and deflection of expenses as taxpayers attempt to di-
vert as much active income (and as little expense) as possible to for-
eign subsidiaries located in low-tax jurisdictions."
6. Potential Negative Tax Rate on Foreign Income
As demonstrated by Fleming, Peroni, and Shay, the current
deferral system with all of its complexity can be manipulated to pro-
duce a result that is even more favorable than an exemption system.
V. THE EXEMPTION SYSTEM
A. A Description of the Exemption System
Unlike the deferral system discussed in Section IV, where both
the foreign state and the home state tax the foreign subsidiary, the
exemption system only permits the foreign state to tax the foreign
subsidiary. In a pure exemption system, when the income earned
from a foreign subsidiary is repatriated back into the parent com-
pany's country, there is no tax on the repatriation. That is, the divi-
dend is exempt from tax in the home country.
53. Editorial, Obama's Global Tax Raid, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2009, at A13.
54. Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on International Income: End It, Don't Mend It-
Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?, 79 TEx L. REV. 1609 (2001).
55. Id. at 1610.
56. TREASURY, TRANSFER PRICING REPORT, supra note 31, at 47. See also Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., The Case for Tax Sparing Along with Expanding and Limiting the Subpart F
Regime, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 303, 310 (2003) (finding that the transfer pricing rules
established in Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code are both "complex and difficult to
administer").
57. Clifton J. Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than Exemption,
59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009).
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Several countries implement an exemption system in some form,
including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands."
The exemption systems in these countries were the subject of a GAO
report.5 9 The report found that countries can "[v]ary in the [t]ypes of
[f]oreign-[s]ource [i]ncome [e]xempted from [d]omestic [t]ax." 6 0
These "study countries generally exempt, but to varying extents, in-
come of domestic corporations received as foreign-source dividends
from foreign subsidiaries, sales by foreign branches, and the gains
from the sale of shares in foreign subsidiaries."6 1
An exemption system can be illustrated by a modification of the
above example involving State Oil, which is engaged in the oil explo-
ration business and is headquartered in State College, Pa. Again, as-
sume that State Oil is faced with the following investment decision:
(1) invest $50 million in oil exploration and refining in State Col-
lege, which is expected to produce $10 million in annual taxa-
ble income, or
(2) set up a subsidiary in China, China Oil Sub., and have it invest
$50 million in oil exploration and refining in China, which is
also expected to produce $10 million in annual taxable income.
Thus, the pretax return of both investments is $ 10 million. How-
ever, State Oil Corp. is faced with a 35% effective corporate tax rate
in the U.S., and China Oil Sub. would be faced with a 15% effective
corporate tax rate in China.6 2 Other things being equal, under an ex-
emption system, which investment decision would State Oil Corp.
make?
Unlike the deferral system, where China and then the U.S. would
tax State Oil Corp. for a cumulative tax rate of 35%, under the ex-
emption system, State Oil Corp. is taxed only in China at the local tax
rate of 15%. Therefore, under this scenario, State Oil Corp. would
only pay $1.5 million in taxes, meaning its after-tax income on its in-
vestment would be $8.5 million. This is the same after-tax income
with a deferral system, provided there is no repatriation of the in-
come. Even if State Oil Corp. were to repatriate its earnings as a divi-
dend, there would be no tax on the dividend because the dividend
would be exempt from home country tax.




62. Assume for the purpose of this discussion that the effective corporate tax rates are the
same as the maximum statutory rates.
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B. The Benefits of the Exemption System
1. Capital Export Neutrality and Competitiveness
An exemption system is consistent with the capital import neu-
trality principle and thereby promotes foreign competitiveness by put-
ting foreign subsidiaries on a level playing field with (1) businesses in
the host foreign country, and (2) foreign subsidiaries owned by parent
corporations located in other countries with exemption systems where
the foreign subsidiaries are doing business in the host foreign country.
Thus, a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent company, operating in a
U.S. exemption system would be on a level playing field with a com-
peting foreign subsidiary of a foreign parent company operating in
foreign jurisdictions, which also employ an exemption system. Argua-
bly, moving to an exemption system would have the effect of strength-
ening a U.S. company's competitive advantage in the world.
However, the ability to compete has many aspects, including the
cost of labor and the state of a country's infrastructure, that are likely
to be more important to the ability to compete than the income tax
rate. Also, the following is an analogy to this competitiveness argu-
ment in the context of domestic taxation. Since S corporations are
subject to only one level of taxation, in making investments and oper-
ating, they should have an advantage over C corporations, which are
subject to two levels of taxation. Although this argument is theoreti-
cally sound, there seems to be no evidence that, as a practical matter,
S corporations have such an advantage over C corporations.
2. Avoids "Lockout Effect"
An exemption system also avoids the "lockout effect" present
with the deferral system. Since with an exemption system, there is no
tax on the repatriation of earnings, there is no artificial barrier to
moving earnings out of a foreign subsidiary and into the U.S.
3. Potential Reduction in Complexity
An exemption system would likely ease some of the complexity
of the U.S. income tax system.63 If the U.S. were to adopt a pure
exemption system the foreign tax credits and the basket system pre-
sent in the deferral system would be much less important. Also, com-
63. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a Proposed U.S.
Exemption (Territorial) Tax System, 109 TAX NoTEs 1557 (2005).
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panies would no longer need to use cross-crediting to offset higher
corporate tax rates paid in a foreign country with respect to active
income.
4. Capital Ownership Neutrality
The capital ownership neutrality (CON) principle, which purport-
edly provides a more concrete theoretical basis for an exemption sys-
tem than the capital import neutrality principle, is beyond the scope of
this article. However, I agree with the conclusion of Fleming, Peroni,
and Shay that the purported benefits of an exemption system identi-
fied by CON are "unlikely to occur. "64
C. The Problems with the Exemption System
1. Continued Complexity
While some claim that the exemption system is easy to under-
stand and easy to use, there are those that argue that the exemption
system is more complex than people think.6 5 The following is a list of
several reasons an exemption system is likely to be full of complexity:
First, [exemption] systems have to define the income that is exempt.
In practice, [exemption] systems tend to apply only to active busi-
ness income. Even within that category, the [exemption] system
may only exempt active business income: (a) if it faces taxes above a
certain threshold level in the host country, (b) from a certain type of
business (for example, e-commerce), and/or (c) from certain coun-
tries. Second, the treatment of non-exempt income must be speci-
fied. Third, the allocation of income and expenses across
jurisdictions takes on heightened importance in [an exemption] sys-
tem. For all of these reasons, [exemption] systems end up with com-
plex rules regarding foreign tax credits, antideferral mechanisms,
and allocation of income and expenses.66
While theoretically an exemption system may seem like an easy
system (i.e., only pay tax in the country where the business is located),
no country has adopted a pure form of the exemption system. Conse-
64. Fleming, Perspectives, supra note 5, at n.137.
65. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Notes on Corporate Inversions, Export Subsidies, and the
Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L 1495 (Sept. 23, 2002); see also STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., Jer REPORTS ON U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES
(Comm. Print 2003); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, supra note 63; and Edward D.
Kleinbard, supra note 7.
66. Gale, supra note 65.
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quently, carve-outs and exceptions are needed with any exemption
system and these carve-outs and exceptions create complexity.
2. Transfer Pricing and Deflection of Expense Abuse
Also, an exemption system is a magnet for transfer pricing abuse
because companies have an incentive (that is even stronger than the
incentive in a deferral system) to divert active income into subsidiaries
operating in low-taxed jurisdictions. For example, if a parent com-
pany can divert active income earned by the parent to a foreign sub-
sidiary operating in a low-tax jurisdiction, the parent can then
repatriate the income back to the home country without any home
country tax because of the exemption for dividends. This type of im-
mediate round trip sanitization of business profits is not possible in a
deferral system, because the repatriation is subject to tax, assuming no
benefit from the cross-crediting of foreign tax credits.
An exemption system is also a magnet for deflection of expense
abuse, as companies attempt to allocate expenses properly attributa-
ble to foreign income to the home country so that the expenses are
taken against taxable, rather than tax-free, income.
VI. THE IMPUTATION SYSTEM
A. A Description of the Imputation System
In the imputation system, the home country taxes foreign-source
income of foreign subsidiaries when the income is earned and without
regard to where the income is earned. Thus, an imputation system, in
essence, treats a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation the
same as a foreign branch of such U.S. parent. To address the issue of
a foreign subsidiary being subject to a double tax (i.e., taxed on the
same income by both the foreign jurisdiction and the U.S., this system
would provide the U.S. parent a foreign tax credit, subject to limita-
tion, on the imputed income of the foreign subsidiary. With an impu-
tation system a foreign subsidiary is treated similarly to a partnership
or subchapter S corporation, which are flow-through entities; the en-
tity is not subject to tax, but the entity's income is imputed up to the
owners who pay tax on the income.
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In 1961, President Kennedy proposed to significantly curtail
deferral, 67 but the proposal was largely rejected. Instead, Congress
67. President Kennedy's Proposal to Congress for, inter alia, a significant curtailment in
deferral (Apr. 20, 1961), available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/JFKTaxesl961.html. Presi-
dent Kennedy proposed:
III. TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INCOME.
Changing economic conditions at home and abroad, the desire to achieve greater eq-
uity in taxation, and the strains which have developed in our balance of payments posi-
tion in the last few years, compel us to examine critically certain features of our tax
system which, in conjunction with the tax system of other countries, consistently favor
United States private investment abroad compared with investment in our own
economy.
1. Elimination of tax deferral privileges in developed countries and "tax haven" defer-
ral privileges in all countries. Profits earned abroad by American firms operating
through foreign subsidiaries are, under present tax laws, subject to United States tax
only when they are returned to the parent company in the form of dividends. In some
cases, this tax deferral has made possible indefinite postponement of the United States
tax; and, in those countries where income taxes are lower than in the United States, the
ability to defer the payment of U.S. tax by retaining income in the subsidiary [p. 295]
companies provides a tax advantage for companies operating through overseas subsidi-
aries that is not available to companies operating solely in the United States . . . To the
extent that these tax havens and other tax deferral privileges result in U.S. firms invest-
ing or locating abroad largely for tax reasons, the efficient allocation of international
resources is upset, the initial drain on our already adverse balance of payments is never
fully compensated, and profits are retained and reinvested abroad which would other-
wise be invested in the United States. Certainly since the postwar reconstruction of
Europe and Japan has been completed, there are no longer foreign policy reasons for
providing tax incentives for foreign investment in the economically advanced countries.
If we are seeking to curb tax havens, if we recognize that the stimulus of tax deferral is
no longer needed for investment in the developed countries, and if we are to emphasize
investment in this country in order to stimulate our economy and our plant moderniza-
tion, as well as ease our balance of payments deficit, we can no longer afford existing
tax treatment of foreign income. I therefore recommend that legislation be adopted
which would, after a two-step transitional period, tax each year American corporations
on their current share of the undistributed profits realized in that year by subsidiary
corporations organized in economically advanced countries. This current taxation
would also apply to individual shareholders of closely-held corporations in those coun-
tries. Since income taxes paid abroad are properly a credit against the United States
income tax, this would subject the income from such business activities to essentially
the same tax rates as business activities conducted in the United States . . . . While the
rate of expansion of some American [p. 296] business operations abroad may be re-
duced through the withdrawal of tax deferral such reduction would be consistent with
the efficient distribution of capital resources in the world, our balance of payments
needs, and fairness to competing firms located in our own country. At the same time, I
recommend that tax deferral be continued for income from investment in the develop-
ing economies. The free world has a strong obligation to assist in the development of
these economies, and private investment has an important contribution to make. Con-
tinued income tax deferral for these areas will be helpful in this respect. In addition,
the proposed elimination of income tax deferral on United States earnings in industrial-
ized countries should enhance the relative attraction of investment in the less devel-
oped countries. On the other hand, I recommend elimination of the "tax haven" device
anywhere in the world, even in the underdeveloped countries, through the elimination
of tax deferral privileges for those forms of activities, such as trading, licensing, insur-
ance and others, that typically seek out tax haven methods of operation. There is no
valid reason to permit their remaining untaxed regardless of the country in which they
are located.
2. Taxation of Foreign Investment Companies. For some years now we have witnessed
substantial outflows of capital from the United States into investment companies cre-
ated abroad whose principal justification lies in the tax benefits which their method of
operation produces. I recommend that these tax benefits be removed and that income
derived through such foreign investment companies be treated in substantially the same
way as income from domestic investment companies . . ..
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continued the deferral system for active income and enacted the CFC
provisions, which provide for imputation of tax haven type income.
An imputation system has been recently proposed by, among others,
Stephen E. Shay, Treasury International Tax Counsel during the ad-
ministration of the first President Bush. Currently, he is the Deputy
Assistant Treasury Secretary (International Tax Affairs) in the admin-
istration of President Obama.6 8
An imputation system can be illustrated by reference to the ex-
ample above with State Oil Corp. Under such a system, State Oil
Corp. would be taxed currently on the income earned by China Oil
Sub. In other words, the income of China Oil Sub. would be imputed
to State Oil Corp., as it is earned. Also, State Oil Corp. would, within
limits, receive a foreign tax credit for the China tax paid by China Oil
Sub. There would be no additional tax on the payment by China Oil
Sub. to State Oil Corp. of the imputed profits as dividends.
Thus, under an imputation system, State Oil Corp. would be
taxed in the U.S. on the $10 million of income earned by China Oil
Sub., which would produce a tentative U.S. tax of $3.5 million. How-
ever, State Oil Corp. would receive a credit of $1.5 million against that
tax for the China taxes paid by China Oil Sub., producing a final U.S.
tax liability of $2 million. Thus, the total of the U.S. and China's taxes
would be $3.5 million. Under this system, the after-tax return from
investing in the U.S. and China would be the same. Therefore, the
investment playing field would be level.
B. The Benefits of the Imputation System
1. Capital Export Neutrality
Contrary to the premise of the exemption system, which relies on
the concept of capital import neutrality, an imputation system relies
on the concept of capital export neutrality, which holds that a tax-
payer should pay the same amount of tax on income earned both in-
side and outside of the resident country.
68. See, e.g., Fleming, Perspectives, supra note 5; Robert Peroni, Clifton Fleming, & Stephen
Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign-Source Income, 52 SMU
L. REv. 455 (1999); see also Fleming & Peroni, supra note 63 (analyzing the territorial proposal
of the tax reform panel report and a similar proposal by the JCT and concluding that the U.S.




The main benefit of the imputation system is that it promotes ec-
onomic efficiency.69 An imputation system achieves economic effi-
ciency because it does not distort investment decisions; it does not
permit home country income taxes to be a consideration in where in-
vestment is located. Therefore, an imputation system would lessen
the impact of tax havens or financial privacy jurisdictions. An imputa-
tion system will allow companies to make decisions based on econom-
ics and business principles rather than on possible tax implications.
3. Preserving the Tax Base
Preserving the U.S. tax base is another benefit that can be
achieved by adopting the imputation system. Under an exemption
system, income earned abroad is lost forever from the U.S. tax base
while under the imputation system all income earned abroad is re-
flected in the tax base.
4. Horizontal and Vertical Equity
Adopting an imputation system will also promote horizontal and
vertical equity.70 Horizontal equity is achieved when taxpayers who
are similarly situated, or are earning similar levels of income, are
taxed at the same effective rate. Horizontal equity within the corpo-
rate sector can be achieved by taxing corporations at the same effec-
tive corporate tax rate regardless of where the income is earned." An
imputation system would not give benefit to a foreign subsidiary lo-
cated in the Cayman Islands over a domestic subsidiary located in
Pennsylvania.
Vertical equity is the concept that taxpayers who are earning
higher levels of income should shoulder more of the overall tax bur-
den in the resident country because taxpayers earning higher levels of
income have a greater ability to pay taxes. Vertical equity will be pro-
moted under an imputation system because foreign-source income
will be included in income and subjected to progressive rates. 7 2 For
69. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., Jer REPORTS ON U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL TAX RULES 4 (Comm. Print 2003).
70. Id. See also Fleming, Perspectives, supra note 5 (discussing "Fairness Considerations"
and the "Ability to Pay").
71. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., Jcr. REPORTS ON U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL TAX RULES 3 (Comm. Print 2003).
72. Id.
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example, if a U.S. individual owned all of the stock of a foreign corpo-
ration, under an imputation system, all of the income earned by the
foreign corporation would be included in the shareholder's gross in-
come and would thereby be subject to the U.S. progressive rate sys-
tem applicable to individuals under Section 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Consequently, there would be little, if any, tax incentive under
an imputation system for the wealthy taxpayers to earn income
abroad. A progressive rate system also applies to corporations under
Section 11 of the Internal Revenue Code.
5. Fewer Transfer Pricing and Deflection of Expense Abuses
An imputation system improves economic efficiency because it
allows the taxing authority to expend fewer resources in monitoring
foreign-source income. In looking at the problems associated with
transfer pricing, an imputation system would resolve the problem as it
exists with outbound and inbound sales and services transactions be-
tween a U.S. parent corporation and a foreign subsidiary. The impu-
tation system achieves this result because income earned in source
states would be subject to a total tax at the home country rate. There-
fore, profits will be taxed at the same rate no matter where they are
earned. Transfer pricing issues would still arise with respect to trans-
actions between a foreign parent corporation and its U.S. subsidiary.
An imputation system would also largely eliminate any incentive for
deflection of expense abuse between U.S. parent corporations and
their foreign subsidiaries.
6. Revenue Savings
Another benefit of an imputation system is the additional reve-
nue it would generate. The Joint Committee on Taxation's October
2008 Tax Expenditure Report shows that only the allowance for accel-
erated depreciation for equipment produces a larger corporate tax ex-
penditure (i.e., reduction in tax liability) than the deferral provision."
Thus, of the nearly 150 corporate tax expenditures covered in the re-
port, only one produces a greater revenue loss than the deferral provi-
sion.7 4 This means that any meaningful amendment to the corporate
tax would have to consider the deferral tax expenditure, which the
73. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., EsTIATES OF FEDERAL TAX




Joint Committee estimated will result in the loss of $62.9 billion in tax
revenues over the period 2008-2012.
It is not clear if this estimate takes into account all of the detri-
ments associated with transfer pricing and expense deflection abuse
under the current deferral system. If such abuses are not included in
this revenue estimate, then the tax revenue gain from moving to an
imputation system would be even greater.
7. Potential Reduction in the Corporate Tax Rate for All
Corporations
a. The Economic Case for a Reduction in the Corporate Tax
Rates with the Adoption of an Imputation System
The repeal of the deferral system could, on a revenue neutral ba-
sis, provide the revenue needed to significantly reduce the current
35% maximum corporate tax rate. Professor Clemons has reported
that the revenue gained from the "repeal of the deferral provision
[could be used on such a revenue neutral basis to] decrease the top
corporate tax rate for all U.S. corporations from 35 percent to 28 per-
cent."7 5 Thus, the trade-off with this type of revenue neutral policy
would be (1) increasing the tax rate on companies investing abroad,
and (2) reducing the maximum tax rate from 35% to 28% on all com-
panies, both those investing abroad and those investing domestically.
Under this approach, investment in the U.S. would be more at-
tractive for both U.S. and foreign companies because the 28% rate
would also apply to foreign companies operating in the U.S. Also,
even though there would be immediate imputation of foreign income,
the imputed income would be taxed at a lower rate than the current
35% rate applicable to companies that earn foreign income and imme-
diately repatriate it to the U.S. Thus, those U.S. companies that cur-
rently repatriate low-taxed foreign income on a current basis would
receive a tax reduction.
To summarize, the trade off is between (1) keeping the current
deferral system, which gives a select group of U.S. corporations a
lower tax rate on foreign earnings, and (2) adopting an imputation
system, which gives all U.S. corporations and all foreign corporations
doing business in the U.S. the benefit of a lower corporate tax rate.
75. Roy Clemons, U.S. International Tax Policy: Is Significant Reform on the Way?, 55 TAX
NOTES INT'L 965, (2009).
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There is a general consensus among economists that there are
many economic benefits from lowering corporate tax rates.7 6 For ex-
ample, Martin A. Sullivan 71 claims that "with rate cuts, a government
can directly reduce corporations' incentives to move profits to low-tax
countries by paying their affiliates interest, royalties, and artificially
high prices."" Sullivan relies on a Congressional Budget Office re-
port from November 2005, which shows that reducing the corporate
tax rate would substantially lessen a corporation's desire to shift prof-
its overseas. 7 9 An imputation system is the only system that can suc-
cessfully address the challenge of income shifting.
b. The Political Case for a Reduction the Corporate Tax Rates
with the Adoption of an Imputation System
By adopting an imputation system, Congress can decide to use
the revenue gained from the elimination of deferral for some other
purpose. However, it would be politically prudent for Congress to
devote a significant portion of the revenue pick-up to fund a meaning-
ful reduction in the corporate tax rate.
When President Kennedy proposed in 1961 that Congress signifi-
cantly curtail deferral,so many in the business world lobbied in opposi-
tion to the proposal, and it can be anticipated that many businesses
will lobby against the adoption of an imputation system. However, if
the end of deferral is accompanied by a reduction in the corporate tax
rate, political support for such a move should come from companies
that do not have significant offshore business operations, thereby
gaining active business support to balance against the large companies
that will be actively opposing such a change.
The political attractiveness of this approach is illustrated by the
proposal in February 2010 by Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and
Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) for the adoption of The Bipartisan Tax Fairness
and Simplification Act of 2010.81 The explanation of the proposal,
which encompasses many reforms to both the individual and corpo-
rate income taxes, explains that the proposal would (1) "eliminate[]
76. Fleming, Perspectives, supra note 5 at n.141.
77. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: A New Era in Corporate Taxation, 41 TAX
NOTES INT'L 415, (2006).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 67.
81. The Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2010, S. 3018, 111th Cong. (2010)
(sponsored by U.S. Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Judd Gregg (R-N.H.)).
2010] 363
Howard Law Journal
incentives for companies to export jobs and keep their foreign earn-
ings overseas by repealing the rule that allows U.S. companies to defer
taxes on their foreign income," and (2) "reduc[e] the top corporate
tax rate and replac[e] the existing six corporate rates and eight brack-
ets with a single flat rate of 24 percent."
C. The Problems with the Imputation System
1. Continued Complexity with the Foreign Tax Credit System
While there are those that champion the imputation system, it is
not without its critics. One of its problems is that companies would
still have to deal with the complexity embedded in the foreign tax
credit rules. In using foreign tax credits, multinational corporations
would still be able to cross-credit. Therefore, the benefit of easing the
economic efficiency could be eroded by efforts that both multinational
corporations and the IRS will have to expend in complying with the
foreign tax credit provisions.
2. Decrease in Foreign Competitiveness
By not allowing foreign subsidiaries to defer payments or ex-
empting foreign subsidiaries from paying any tax to the resident state,
money that could be used to spur foreign re-investment is lost. A U.S.
parent's foreign subsidiary operating in a low-tax jurisdiction would
not be on an equal level playing field with regard to taxes on its opera-
tions when compared to (1) a locally owned competitor, and (2) a
competitor owned by foreign parent company located in a country
with an exemption system. By implementing an imputation system,
multinational corporations may be deterred from investing in foreign
countries because the tax incentives are no longer present. On the
other hand, there would be greater incentives for investing in the U.S.
and a lower corporate tax rate applicable to the foreign income
earned by U.S. controlled foreign subsidiaries.
3. Switching Costs
Another problem with adopting an imputation system is the ad-
ministrative costs associated with switching from the current U.S.
deferral system. For example, if the imputation system were adopted,
a decision would have to be made on the treatment of income that has
been previously deferred. Would that income become subject to im-
mediate U.S. taxation? I would suggest that the previously deferred
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income become subject to tax on a ratable basis over a three or four
year period. This is similar to the rules that applied as a result of the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986), which forced
certain tax-exempt Keogh plans onto a calendar year basis, thus elimi-
nating the benefit of deferral for the owners of such plans.82 The in-
come resulting from the elimination of this deferral by the TRA 1986
was included in the income of the owner ratably over a four-year
period.
Further, the issue of foreign tax credits would need to be ad-
dressed. Under an imputation system the U.S. would have to decide
whether it would still allow foreign corporations the ability to cross-
credit.
4. The New Zealand Experience
On October 9, 2009, New Zealand switched its system for taxing
foreign-source income from an imputation system to an exemption
system. The reasons behind this switch from one tax system to an-
other were to "'put New Zealand businesses on a better footing inter-
nationally by freeing them from a tax cost that the controlled foreign
companies of other countries do not face.' "" New Zealand also ex-
pressed that its "goal is to design a system that is both simple for New
Zealand businesses to work with and preserves the integrity of New
Zealand income."85
VII. CONCLUSION
While there are no easy solutions to the complexities presented in
international taxation, the imputation system offers many benefits
over the current deferral system or an exemption system. One of the
major benefits of an imputation system is the elimination of bias in
favor of foreign investments over U.S. investments. Another benefit
is that an imputation system would preserve the U.S. tax base. As
indicated in the discussion above on the tax expenditures associated
82. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX RE-
FORM Acr OF 1986 (May 4, 1987), G. Taxable Years of Partnerships, S Corporations, and Per-
sonal Service Corporations (§ 806 of the Act and §§ 706, 1378, 441, & 267 of the Code) 533.
83. Id. at 538.
84. Mary Swire, New Zealand Forges Ahead with International Tax Reform, Oct. 23, 2007,
http://www.tax-news.com/archive/story/NewZealandForges AheadWith InternationalTax_





with the current deferral system, the U.S. loses billions of dollars in
tax revenue in its current deferral system and this would also be true
with an exemption system. With more tax revenue coming in every
year under an imputation system, the U.S. would be able to signifi-
cantly lower their corporate tax rate for all its corporations. A reduc-
tion in the corporate tax rate would lead to an increase in both U.S.
and foreign investment inside the U.S., which would then increase the
U.S. tax base.
By enacting an imputation system, U.S. multinational corpora-
tions would no longer have an incentive to abuse the transfer pricing
rules by deflecting income to foreign subsidiaries or to enter into abu-
sive transactions to deflect expenses to U.S. parents. Such abuses are
significant in the current deferral system and would be even greater in
an exemption system.
Finally, although New Zealand has abandoned its imputation sys-
tem in favor of an exemption system similar to that in Australia, the
U.S. should not let the tax policies of other countries drive its deci-
sions regarding the most appropriate U.S. tax policy. The U.S. should
be a leader in addressing this issue and lead our major trading part-
ners in the adoption of an imputation system. It is my belief that such
a move would likely influence other countries to abandon their ex-
emption systems in favor of imputation systems, thereby following the
U.S. in eliminating the bias in such systems in favor of foreign invest-
ment over home country investment.
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